

Globalization, Inequality and the Conflict Trap in Sub-Saharan Africa*

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Abstract

The issue of globalization and its effects on inequality has generated much debate and no consensus. Economists belonging to different traditions have however agreed upon one single point: as far as Sub-Saharan Africa is concerned, globalization has not proven a means either for growth or for human development. Some economists have suggested that traps -one of them being the “conflict trap”- are shaping the way and the extent of Africa’s integration into global markets. Indeed, Africa was the only developing region where the incidence of civil war rose over the 1990s. But Africa's proneness to civil war cannot be attributed exclusively to one single cause, namely its dependence on natural resources- as such economists pinpoint. In this paper, we will look at the relationship between globalization and inequality in reverse. We will use case studies of African civil wars to suggest that horizontal inequalities may be held responsible for increased civil war risk and, thus, for the conflict trap which hinders the chance for African countries to utilize globalization for development.

Introduction

The issue of globalization and its effects on inequality is currently one of the hottest topics in economics as well as in sociology. Great effort has been devoted by different scholars in order to discern the consequences of a phenomenon which the World Bank officially defines as “*freedom and ability of individuals and firms to initiate voluntary economic transactions with residents of other countries*”. Much of the debate has been ideologically led: on one hand, those adopting a neoliberal discourse have contended that “*global inequality has declined since 1980 [representing] an important reverse of a long historical pattern of rising global inequality*” (Dollar 2004:19) as well as “*the number of poor people in the world has declined by 375 million, the first such decline in history*” (Dollar 2004:16). On the other hand, those endorsing the standard Left assumption have argued that “*the rich and powerful countries have little interest in greater equity*” (Wade 2004:568) and have asserted that “*world poverty and inequality have been rising, not falling, due to forces unleashed by the same globalization*” (Wade 2004:568). Accordance has however been found on two points: first, the way they have looked at the relationship between globalization and inequalities, namely the impact of globalization on inequality; second, the finding that globalization has not worked well for African growth. In this paper, we will look at globalization and inequalities in reverse: we will suggest that the degree of inequalities, and particularly of horizontal inequalities in Sub-Saharan African countries, has made the conflict fall into a “*conflict trap*” (Collier et al. 2003, Collier 2006). Such a trap has in turn affected the manifestations and the results of their integration in the global markets, as Collier (2006) has suggested. We will use three case studies, in particular those of civil strife in Casamance, lower Senegal, of secessionist uprising in Biafra, South-Eastern Nigeria and of Frelimo versus Renamo confrontation in Mozambican civil war, to suggest that group inequalities have increased African propensity to civil struggle and, thus, jeopardized the chance for African countries to get the best out of globalization, while getting the worst.

1. A review of the debate over globalization and inequality.

While analysing globalization, scholars have asked themselves several questions, such as its effect on growth, on poverty and on inequality. Neoliberal economists have generally expressed some degree of optimism on the equalizing and pro-poor force of the process of globalization. Dollar (2004), for example, has contended that global inequality among citizens of the world has declined since 1980 – which the exceptional growth of “*poor locations such as China, India, Bangladesh, and Vietnam accounts for*” (Dollar 2004:20). He has further argued that within-countries inequalities have not generally increased and that, as far as absolute poverty is concerned, the absolute number of poor people in the world has sharply declined – by 375 million since 1981 (2004:19). Other economists have adopted a more doubtful approach. Bourguignon and Morrison (2002), for instance, have contended that since the end of World War Two world distribution of income has been stable or its tendency to inequality has been slower than it had been from the beginning of the 19th century to World War II. They have further remarked that while “*inequality among countries is a key factor in explaining world inequality*”, at the same time “*world inequality is not well approximated by the hypothesis that all citizens within a country have the same income*” (2002: 727). Milanovic (2002) has singled out two different dimensions of globalization: the share of exports and imports in GDP as well as foreign direct investment as a percentage of recipient country’s GDP. He has then regressed the change in within-country inequalities (based on household budget surveys) on measures of globalization, finding that for the bottom seven deciles, integration into global markets is negatively related with their income share. He has however found that such negative effect is lessened insofar as a country’s mean income rises, thus making him conclude that “*openness makes income distribution worse before making it better*” (2002:20). Finally, some economists have taken a rather pessimistic stand, pinpointing that world PPP-income polarization has increased, with the top 10% being “*comprised almost entirely of people living in the core countries of North America, western Europe, and Japan, where incomes have grown over the past 20-30 years, while a large chunk of the bottom 10% is comprised of African countries where incomes have stagnated or fallen*” (Wade 2004:576).

Of course, many of the apparent contradictions among different empirical findings depend upon the operational definitions that are used to measure the impact of globalization on inequalities. First of all, regardless of its official definition, when it comes to measurement, globalization appears as the “*aggregate result of integration on behalf of many individual countries*” (Aisbett 2003:6). Each country's degree of

integration can be measured in two different ways: “the first is to determine the level of restrictions placed on the movements of goods, services and factor into and out of the country”, and “the second [...] is the relative size of the flows of goods, services, profits into and out of the country” (Aisbett 2003:6). But also when measuring world income inequality, several choices are available, including “alternative measures of income; alternative weightings of countries; alternative measures of the distribution; alternative sources of data on incomes; alternative samples of countries and time periods” (Wade 2004:575). It is therefore certainly true that between-country world PPP-income inequality has been constant or falling since around the 1980, however just the exclusion of China and India would reverse such empirical finding, pinpointing pronounced widening inequalities (Wade 2004). Further, when measuring incomes at market exchange rates and expressed in US dollars, world income distribution appears to have grown rapidly more unequal (Wade 2004).

2. The consensus over Africa's stagnation.

Scholars belonging to different traditions seem to reconcile when it comes to assess Sub-Saharan Africa's performance in the scenario of increased global market integration. There appears to be some consensus over Africa's bad performance and increasing burden of poverty and inequality. If on one hand Paul Collier (2006:188) has remarked that “over the past 40 years Africa has stagnated”, diverging from the other developing countries that “are on track to joining China in becoming middle-income countries” (Collier et al. 2003:101), on the other Jeffrey Sachs (Sachs et al. 2004:117) has stated that “Africa's development crisis is unique”, for “not only is Africa the poorest region in the world, but it was also the only major developing region with negative growth in income per capita during 1980-2000”. Although highlighting that some African countries, such as Uganda, have achieved accelerated growth, even the globalization-optimists like Dollar have underlined that “the number of extreme poor in Africa increased from 164 million (41.6 per cent of the population) to 316 million (46.9 per cent of the population)” (2004: 18) between 1981 and 2001, predicting that if current rates of growth in Asia persist, then “global poverty will increasingly be concentrated in Africa” (2004:19). Dollar (2004:21) has further noted that if current slow growth rate persists in Africa, “global inequality will eventually rise again”. In terms of how and how much African countries have managed to globalize, Collier (2006:190) has hypothesized they can be subdivided into three different groups: first, “countries with large natural resource rents”; second, “coastal countries not dominated by resource rents”; and third, “landlocked resource-poor countries”. The first group has indeed integrated into global markets through the export of natural resources. But the second and third group have not. According to Collier (2006:190), the second group—with the exception of Mauritius—has missed the chance to transit to middle-income status, as “during the critical decade of the 1980s, when other coastal economies were starting to break into world markets, almost all of Africa's coastal economies were beset by one or the other of four policy “syndromes” that made diversification impossible. These syndromes were excessive economic regulation, intertemporal errors such as boom-bust cycles, interethnic redistribution and violent conflict”. The third group has not had the chance to globalize: the only resource this group may have counted upon is unskilled labour, yet such abundance has been counteracted by high costs of imported inputs, making it impossible for African land-locked economies to survive Asian competitors. What the three groups of African countries share is the failure to utilize globalization for development. While there are geographical reasons for it—countries depending on natural resource rents and landlocked resource-poor economies have globally performed badly—, there must be something special about Africa itself that jeopardizes its own chances to grow and develop, if even coastal economies (that globally “have achieved rapid and indeed accelerating growth” (Collier 2006:190)) have performed badly. Collier (2006) has hypothesized that four exclusively African traps are to be blamed:

1. first, a “corruption trap”, according to which corruption was introduced in African states by socialist and Marxist regimes introducing economic regulation and later, once such regimes had collapsed, it had already become a widespread custom, thus not providing any incentive to new entrants in society to behave honestly;
2. second, a “primary commodity trap”: 1/3 of African population lives in countries that are dependent on primary commodity exports and this generates problems such as vulnerability to shocks, Dutch disease, worsening of economic policy and specialization in primary commodities not allowing for the agglomeration of manufacturing industry;

3. third, the “*fractionalized society trap*”: Africa displays a bundle of characteristics- high social heterogeneity and low protection of political rights- that is globally bad for growth;
4. fourth, the “*conflict trap*”: Africa has a high propensity to civil war. Civil strife displays the properties of a trap: for a country that has experienced civil war, “*during the first post-conflict decade, there is an approximately 50% risk of going back into conflict*” (Collier 2006:191). Further, civil strife itself hinders the possibility of economic diversification and tends to lower growth as well as the level of income, in other words it accentuates the bundle of economic characteristics originally accounting for an increased risk of civil war.

We will now focus on the “conflict trap”. Such trap obviously reinforces the others: a conflictual environment certainly does not provide any incentive for diversification out of natural resource rents nor does it allow for protection of political rights. Indeed Africa, besides having stagnated since the 1960s (Collier 2006), has also been the only developing region in which the incidence of civil war rose over the 1990s (Collier et al. 2003). Collier and Hoeffler (2000) have explained African propensity to civil conflict through the bundle of economic characteristics distinguishing Africa from the other developing regions: low income, slow economic growth or stagnation, and dependence upon the exportation of primary commodities. They have argued in particular that such macro-economic characteristics are responsible for making individual opportunity-costs of joining rebellion very low, thus increasing the risk of civil strife. From the econometric point of view, Collier and Hoeffler have used an OLS regression predicting the probability of civil war (which represents the dependent variable, ranging from 0 to 1) on the following independent variables: a measure of the contribution of primary commodity exports to national GDP; pro-capita GDP; country's rate of growth; a variable indicating the number of months elapsed since the last episode of civil war; a measure of population size; a population concentration index; an index of social fragmentation and finally an index of ethnic dominance. Collier and Hoeffler in particular have argued that the contribution of natural resources exports to national GDP proxies a funding opportunity for rebel movements, for they assume countries depending on resource rents must be resource-rich and such abundant resources can be looted by the rebels. They have further contended that pro-capita GDP and its rate of growth proxy opportunity costs for rebel group formation, as a country's bad economic performance constitutes a low productivity environment in which potential rebels may find it more profitable to engage in civil strife than to remain a civilian. Finally, Collier and Hoeffler have argued that population size and density, recent experience of civil strife and ethnic composition of society may be regarded as military advantages/disadvantages for rebel group organization. In particular, countries that have recently experienced civil war are held to be more likely to fall into further civil strife, as they are automatically awarded a “war capital” which the rebels can count upon to get formed and survive as a group. Countries with numerous populations are also supposed to be more prone to civil war as, *ceteris paribus*, they make easier the task of summoning enough potential rebels. Sparsely populated countries should further provide a military advantage to rebels, as they make guerilla tactics viable. Finally countries having socially heterogeneous populations should have a reduced risk of civil war, as the organization of rebel groups is made harder by the increased cost of collective actions. If, however, a single ethnic group makes up 45% to 90% of a country's population- a situation called “ethnic dominance”- the risk of civil war is supposed to increase, as exclusive intra-group recruitment is possible and lowers coordination costs, while at the same time minority groups are still numerous enough to keep control of a significant amount of resources which the rebels can appropriate.

We hold that the Collier-Hoeffler model (from now on, CH model) cannot provide an exhaustive explanation of civil war risk. The model is in fact based on the assumption that individual agents rationally calculate the benefits of rebellion in a social vacuum, and may regard it as profitable regardless of its outcomes. We contend such assumption fits quite clumsily the reality of a social phenomenon such as civil war, where groups may not be viewed as exclusively increasing/decreasing the costs of collective action. Indeed, “*group membership [is] in fact what makes up the identity (or multiple identities) of individuals*” (Stewart 2001:2). Reference to methodological individualism is, in our opinion, closely related to neglecting of inequality as a determinant of civil war. Collier and Hoeffler had inserted in their regression a measure of vertical income which, having proved to be non-statistically significant,

was thus omitted in the final specification. We however suspect that- had Collier and Hoeffler looked at horizontal inequalities- the results might have been different. We will refer to Stewart who has been the first to analyse the social consequences of horizontal inequalities, defined as “*inequalities between culturally defined groups*” (2001:3). Stewart has abandoned the exclusive focus on income characterizing research on vertical inequalities and identified three dimensions of inequalities, one concerning political participation, one relating to economic aspects such as assets and employment and incomes and, finally, one regarding social access and situation. She has then constructed a list of indicators for each of the three dimensions: the degree of representation in the government ministers, in the parliament, in the army, the police, the local government, the civil service, as well as the degree of respect for human rights represent indicators of political participation. Access to land and to communal resources, to minerals and to privately owned capital/credit, but also the degree of human capital and of protection of property rights are held as sources of economic differentiation in terms of assets. Average incomes, opportunities of employment in the private, in the government and in the informal sectors, average rents, and predominance of skilled/unskilled labour in a group are further measures of economic disparities. Finally, group education level, access to health services, safe water and housing, level of personal and household security, opportunities for employment and poverty indicate a group's social situation. We maintain that while Stewart's typology is a good starting point providing a useful grid for empirical analysis, her approach needs to be ameliorated: inequalities may differentiate not only culturally-formed but also socially-formed groups. Moreover inequalities matter not only in absolute but also in relative terms: when members of one group grieve about being (or perceiving to be) relatively worse off than members on another group, civil strife may become more probable.

Case Studies

In the next section, we will examine the dynamics of civil war outbreak in three different African countries and confront them with predictions of the Collier-Hoeffler model. In particular, we will examine the low-intensity but very long civil conflict in Casamance, Southern Senegal, which clearly shows the importance of horizontal inequalities among ethnic groups in augmenting civil war risk. Further, we will review the case of Biafran civil struggle in Nigeria, which suggests that even in resource-rich countries identity-civil wars may occur (discarding the assumption that rebellion is always loot-oriented) and shows that for civil war to become more probable inequalities among groups need not be real, but may just be perceived. Finally, we will review Frelimo versus Renamo struggle in post-independence Mozambique, which shows the importance of a factor the CH model omits, that is third countries' influence on conflict risk, as well as it suggests the importance of group grievances due to relative worsening of social and economic conditions (inequalities may matter even from a diachronic point of view).

Diola upsurge in Casamance, Southern Senegal.

In the period 1985-90, the CH model predicted a low risk of civil war (6.19%) for Senegal, due to high social fractionalization and to the absence of other civil conflict episodes after independence, which counterbalanced the effects of the bad economic performance of the country on the probability of civil strife. Primary commodity exports in fact contributed highly to GDP, both relative to war and non-war countries; GDP per capita was low (1163, compared to 1645 for the average war country and 4219 for the non war country); GDP growth in the 1980-85 period was negative and low in the 1985-90 period (all figures from Sambanis 2003:Appendix). Looking at escalation to war, one can however identify the factors which the CH model omits and which actually increased Senegalese propensity to conflict and ultimately led to civil strife in Casamance. In terms of colonial history, the southern region of Senegal had been controlled for 250 years by the Portuguese (that is where its name, Casa Mansa, derives) until it was given away to the French in 1866. *Casamançais* perceived themselves and actually were culturally different from Northern Senegalese population in ethnic, economic and religious terms. The Diola were the major ethnic group in Casamance (which, by the way, was the most ethnically-fragmented region (Sambanis 2003: Appendix)) and they represented 10% of total population. They were mainly animist (although they welcomed Catholicism, as catholic priests contributed to found schools in the region); they strongly defended their own language; as their region had a Guinean climate, they could cultivate rice, which was also an element of their religious practices; they venerated the forest, which

predominated their territory and which they believed to be at risk because of droughts and modernization (Gasbarri and Giordano 1978:54). Northern Senegal was instead dominated by the Wolof, representing 43.3% of total population (CIA World Fact Book 2008). The Wolof observed Islam, their tongue had become the *lingua franca* both in educational institutions and in the media, and as their region was characterized by Sahelian weather they specialized in the cultivation of peanuts, which did not grant the country's food security but did generate substantial revenues for the government (Senegal was the third biggest peanut exporter in 1978). During World War Two, Casamançais had already attempted their way to self-determination, as the Prophetess An Sitoë had organised resistance against French forced recruitment, causing a bitter reaction from Paris (Clarke and Phillips 1994:163). Independentist tendencies persisted, as it is indicated by the fact that during the Biafran insurgency, President Senghor had supported the Nigerian government against the rebels, fearing the Casamançais could imitate them, and when civil strife broke out in neighbouring Guinea-Bissau he impeded the PACG (*Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde*) to transport their arms through Casamance, as he was worried they could dangerously spread throughout the region. From 1978 on, Senegal's proclivity to conflict was further aggravated by government policies pitting Casamançais against Northerners. As droughts destroyed all peanut production in 1973 and in 1978, Casamançais rice farms were expropriated by the government, which depended on primary commodities exports, and burnt out by the Northerners, who started peanut cultivation there. Expropriation caused not only an economic damage to the Casamançais, but was also felt as an offence to religious beliefs. Moreover, constitutional reforms in 1978 established Wolof should be the language in which prospective teachers had to be taught. This was felt as strengthening the already existing educational disparities between the Diola and the Wolof: in 1976 the secondary school attendance rate was much lower in Casamance than in Cape Verde (the region including Dakar) and in the other northern regions of Fiume and Thiès (Gasbarri and Giordano 1978). Further, the government did not invest adequately in agricultural development for Casamance, although the region was essential for granting country's food security (rice demand was three times larger than supply). In particular, the government had promised to construct two dams which would have reclaimed 200.000 hectares of land and impeded salted water to damage rice cultivations. However, still in 1984 only technical studies had been accomplished. Bad weather conditions had decreased rice yield in 1977-78 from average 100.000 tons to 62.000 tons. During the 1978 elections of Rural Councils, Casamançais dissent had turned into increased support for the opposition party, PDS, compared to the results of legislative elections which were held a few months before.

In the early 1980s, a movement called Mouvement des Forces Democratiques de Casamance (MFDC) started demanding self-determination for the region. The MFDC had actually been born in 1947 and had been later dissolved by President Senghor, who co-opted many of its leaders into the national party he led. He had allegedly exchanged cooptation with self-determination for Casamance, which would be accomplished in 1980, 20 years after independence. In that year, the would-be leader of MFDC, Catholic priest Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, started demanding the pledge to be respected, denouncing that "*Casamance had no link with Senegal, neither a historical link, nor an economic link nor an ethnic link. It was simply for bureaucratic convenience [for the French] that it was administered together with Senegal*" (Collier and Sambanis EDS 2005: 250). The first political act of the MFDC was a peaceful protest in Ziguinchor, on December 26th 1982, which the gendarmerie violently replied to killing many activists and arresting others (including Father Diamacoune). In 1983 President Abdoullah Diouf (who had succeeded to Senghor) enacted some policies in order to gain tighter control of the territory. In particular he divided Casamance into two administrative regions, Kolda and Ziguinchor, though at the same time he ostensibly made a step forward to meet Casamançais demands, as he assigned four Ministries to Casamançais politicians, and in 1984 he launched the Anambe-Kayanga dam. This inconsistent set of policies however did not succeed in appeasing the Casamançais, and a protest in Ziguinchor ensued in December 1983, resulting in 19 activists and 6 gendarmiers being killed and 80 more being wounded..

After 1983, Diouf's policies towards Casamançais claims ambiguously oscillated between repression and appeasement. On one hand, an amnesty was issued resulting in many political prisoners to be

freed, a Casamancais was appointed as Mayor of Ziguinchor and new investments were pumped into that region. But on the other, intelligence and torture were used to dissolve the MFDC. Application of such tactics was actually disproportionate-and it was felt as such by the MFDC- to the aim of maintaining control over the territory, considering that newly-born *Atika*, that is the armed branch of MFDC, still lacking political and military strategies, had no training and was barely equipped with traditional weapons. The first proper military action of *Atika* was conducted only in 1989, when the rebels opposed the national army up north, at the border with Gambia and down south, at the border of Guinea-Bissau, and they attacked civilians who were suspected to be informers for the government in Ziguinchor. Civil war ended with a peace treaty in 2004.

If we analyze MFDC formation we can see the CH model does not fit reality. There is no evidence of resource looting as a means of funding rebellion. In its early stages of development, MFDC in fact only depended on subscriptions by Casamancais, who provided not only money but also food. Casamancais also funded the movement by buying “membership cards”. Last but not least, Diolas living in neighbouring Gambia and in Northern Senegal also supported the MFDC, by organizing periodical fund-raising meetings. Further, in the case of Casamance, social fractionalization did not work as a coordination-cost increasing factor. Casamance was indeed the most ethnically diverse region in Senegal (Sambanis 2003:Appendix). According to CH it should therefore have been unable to give birth to a rebel group. History makes clear that groups counted as far as the Wolof and the Diola were severely differentiated in many respects. Casamancais' situation appeared to be hindered in many respects. To use Stewart's categories, the Casamancais suffered from low political participation, their access to land was seriously jeopardized, the scarce government investment on infrastructure limited the economic assets they could enjoy, their group amount of human capital was kept small by national education policies, and finally their cultural rights were put at risk by Wolof domination in the media and in the administration.

Nigeria 1965-70: the Biafran civil war.

For the period 1965-70, when a civil war broke out in Biafra, South-eastern Nigeria, the CH model predicted a relatively low risk of civil war (approximately 12%) for that country. Such value was determined mainly by modest economic performance and high social heterogeneity. Dependence of Nigerian economy from primary commodity exports was in fact slightly lower (0.123) than the average value of war countries (0.149) and GDP growth was positive (0.19%), contrary to the average war country (-0.23) and lower than no war countries (1.74). Though the value of per capita GDP was very low (567 \$) both compared to war (1645) and no-war (4219) countries, social and ethnic fractionalization was very high and no ethnic dominance could be identified, reducing predicted civil war risk (all figures from Sambanis 2003:Appendix).

In 1967, when the former South-eastern region of Nigeria self-proclaimed itself as the independent nation of Biafra, the country had been a sovereign state for seven years. The Littleton Constitution in 1954 had established it would be born as a federal state, in which the regions would have legislative power over all matters, except those regarding foreign policy, defence, policing, communication and transports, financial and commercial policies. Oil production had started only recently, in 1958, and the property of oil reserves was ruled by a decree in 1959, which established federal property over them. Nigerian independent state was divided in three regions: the Northern region, mainly populated by the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group; the Southern-western region, mainly populated by the Yoruba and the Southern-eastern region, populated by the Ibo. The three ethnic groups represented respectively the 29%, 21% and 18% (CIA World Fact Book 2008) of the population; only the former observed Islam, while, both the Yoruba and the Ibo were Christian. While at the moment of independence Nigeria on the whole had Africa's best trained and largest civil service, its three regions were not uniformly developed. The Northern region was, on one hand, the most economically backward, as it had been quite isolated from British dominance, which had neither diminished traditional authorities' influence nor modified the educational system, still based on Islamic schools. On the other, citizens of the Southern regions had been educated in British schools, and many of them had acquired positions in the colonial administration, precipitating Hausa-Fulani's fear of being dominated by the Southern groups. This was the reason why in the 1940s the Northern region had advocated the creation of a federal state.

As the British were keen to preserve the Northerners' loyalty, in 1946 they promulgated the Richards Constitution, which split the Southern region in two different parts-the Western and the Eastern regions- and thus pitted the Yoruba and the Ibo against each other, ultimately facilitating Northern dominance of Nigerian politics. The discovery of oil reserves in the Eastern region, in 1958, exacerbated tension among the three regions for control of the federal state. The legislative elections in 1959 were characterized by sharp opposition among the *Northern People's Congress* (NPC, based in the Northern region), the *National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons* (NCNC, based in the Western region), and the *Action Group* (AG, based in the Eastern region). The majoritarian system permitted the success of the NPC, that is the party which represented the majority of the population's interests and gained control of the federal state, in coalition with the NCNC. Political upsurge was precipitated by violent intraparty clashes in 1962, which forced the AG out of power in the Western region and permitted the rise of a new Western party, the *Nigerian National Democratic Party* (NNDP), which allied itself with the NPC. Such political shift determined Northerners' access to administrative positions, undermining Ibo dominance in that sector. Although the Ibo still maintained highly influential positions in the government, they started fearing dominance by the Hausa Fulani. A coup d'etat followed, bringing Ibo General Ironsi to power. The importance of control of the administrative system for the Ibo is signalled by one of the first acts of Ironsi after he gained power, that is the "Decree 43", which established merit as the unique criterion for access and advancement in the administrative system, therefore benefiting the Ibo, who were the best-trained part of Nigerian population since the colonial times.

Two months after the promulgation of "Decree N. 43", thousands of Ibos were massacred in the Northern region, and a further coup d'etat permitted Hausa-Fulani General Gowon to take power. His first political act was to repeal "Decree N.43". Even after Hausa-Fulani taking of power, the massacre of Ibos continued, with 30.000 perishing in September and October 1966, as a result of Northerners' attacks, and 1.000.000 being displaced from the Northern region. In January 1967, Gowon attempted to compromise with Ibo General Ojukwu, formerly appointed by Ironsi, who had refused to recognize Gowon's authority, as he feared that the possible loss of the Eastern region would cause great economic damage to the Federal Government. He offered the "*Aburi agreement*", which would have granted every federal state the monopoly to the use of legal force in its own territory, and would have required unanimity by all military regional governors for the issue of every single federal decree. While in June 1966, after Gowon's coup d'etat, Ojukwu still retained that Nigeria's "*very survival is through unity; without it we will perish*" (Collier and Sambanis EDS 2005:98), he now rejected the "*Aburi agreement*" on the grounds that "*the brutal and planned annihilation of officers of Eastern Nigerian origin [...] has again cast serious doubts as to whether the people of Nigeria, after these cruel and bloody atrocities, can ever sincerely live together as members of the same nation*" (Collier and Sambanis EDS 2005:98). Ojukwu's refusal of the "*Aburi agreement*", his further order to confiscate all federal properties in the region, and the threat by Western leaders to secede from the federal state, if secession was conceded to the Ibos, worried Gowon, who attempted to mediate again with Ojukwu. Gowon made public plans to subdivide the country in 12 regions, determining the end of Northern supremacy. His plans, however, would deprive the Ibos of control over the oil reserves in the Niger Delta region, and Ojukwu proceeded declaring Biafran independence on May 30th 1967, based on the following grounds: "*awareness of the Biafran population that they could no longer be protected in their lives and their properties by any government outside Easter Nigeria; belief that they were born free and had certain unalienable rights which could be best preserved by themselves; unwillingness to be unfree partners in any association of political or economic nature*" (Collier and Sambanis EDS 2005:99). The Biafran war ended in 1970, with rebels' surrender following food and ammunition exhaustion (Fage:1995).

If we confront the case study with the CH model prediction, we can identify several mismatches. First of all, the resource predation hypothesis does not hold. There is no evidence that natural resources- though abundant in Biafra- were a source of rebel funding. Ibo rebels militating for Biafran independence were formerly part of the federal army, and thus had little need of arms and training. Some sources indicate that Ojukwu actually bought weapons in European black markets, but such purchase was made possible by the legacy Ojukwu's father left to the son upon his death, in September

1966 (Stremlau 1977). Further, case study shows that Hausa-Fulani political dominance actually mattered in conflict escalation, although no ethnic dominance is coded by CH. Most importantly, history pinpoints several sources of differentiation among Ibo and Hausa-Fulani. Following Stewart's typology, we can discern sources of differentiation between the Ibo and the Hausa-Fulani in political, economic and social dimensions. From the political participation stand-point, access to civil service assumed particular importance. In the escalation process that led to civil war, representation in public administration was an important matter of conflict between Ibo and Hausa-Fulani (the issue of Decree 43 by Ironsi and its repeal by Gowon indicate how prominence in public administration positions was valued by both ethnic groups). From the economic point of view, the Ibos grieved they could not have exclusive access to natural resources, namely oil reserves, which were abundant in their region and which- they feared- would benefit the federal government rather than themselves. It is worth noticing that political under-representation and economic disaster were feared rather than actual: Ibo were still represented in civil service and they were not poorer than the Hausa-Fulani, however political turmoil made the former dread about worsening of their life conditions relative to those of the latter. Such fears were also instilled by severe violations of the human rights of the Ibos, like massacres and mass displacement occurred in 1966.

Renamo versus frelimo in Mozambican civil war.

As far as the Mozambican civil war is concerned, the CH model apparently makes a good prediction. In the 1975-80 period, the probability of civil conflict was quite high (approximately 24%), depending primarily on the country's bad economic performance and on the presence of ethnic dominance, with the Macua-Lowme being the numerically dominant group. The degree of dependence from primary commodity exports was in fact remarkable in the period (0.21), higher than the average for war (0.149) countries. At the same time, the pro-capita GDP was slightly lower (1497) than in other war countries (1645). GDP growth, however, was high (3.37) both compared to war (-0.23) and no-war (1.74) countries. Ethnic fractionalization was recorded as high (the index value was 65, while it is 52.6 for the average war country and 38.6 for the average non-war country) and, as the country had just reached independence, there were no prior conflicts coded (all figures from Sambanis 2003:Appendix). This apparently correct prediction hides however the fundamental influence of a factor which is not taken into account by the CH model, that is the intervention of third parties in a civil conflict.

Mozambican civil war started in 1976, a year after independence, as a result of Renamo's attacks against Frelimo, that is the group who pioneered independence from Portugal and took power after the Lusaka accords, which established the end of colonial regime on September 7th 1974.

Frelimo was born in 1962, when different revolutionary groups including mostly Mozambican intellectuals living abroad matched together. During the liberation war, Frelimo's efforts were directed towards pleasing the population by the institution of new schools, hospitals and cooperatives (Azevedo et al. 2003). After taking power, Frelimo started implementing its objectives, such as the nationalisation of the production means, the limitation of private property, collectivization in agriculture, expropriation of economic activities and properties controlled by foreigners, the abolition of religions, elimination of illiteracy, women emancipation, support to liberation movements in Zimbabwe and Namibia and, finally, the eradication of apartheid in South Africa. In 1977, Frelimo eventually declared itself as a Marxist-Leninist Party.

Compared to Frelimo's, Renamo's composition appeared rather heterogeneous: it included former Frelimo members who had been excluded from the movement; Portuguese citizens who had been expropriated of their land properties in Mozambique; former members of the Portuguese army; Mozambican citizens who enjoyed particular benefits during colonial times and, finally, some intellectuals opposing Marxism. Weinstein and Francisco (Collier and Sambanis EDS 2005) argue there are basically two eras in which we can subdivide Renamo's existence before the Mozambican civil war ended in 1992: the first period goes from 1979 to 1981, during which Renamo was created thanks to the logistical and military support of Ian Smith's Rhodesia. Rhodesia not only hosted Mozambican dissidents' camps, but also provided them with military training and equipment. This served Smith's interests as Renamo was not only aimed at subverting Frelimo's policies in Mozambique, but also at fighting against ZANLA (*Zimbabwean African National Liberation Army*) in Rhodesian territory. In the

second period, elapsing from 1981 to 1992, South Africa took over Rhodesia's role, after the Lancaster accords proclaimed Rhodesia's independence in 1980 and its new denomination of Zimbabwe. South Africa offered camps as well as logistical and military support in order for Renamo to fight Frelimo in Mozambique and the African National Congress in South Africa itself. By supporting Renamo, South Africa intended to seek US support, in the contest of sharpening Cold War following Ronald Reagan's taking of power in 1980, for the subversion of the Conference for the Coordination of South African development initiative, in which both Mozambique and Zimbabwe challenged South African supremacy. Aside third actors' influence, there were certainly disharmonic opportunities which increased civil war risk. As Weinstein and Francisco pointed out, *"in the early years, recruits received salaries directly from Rhodesia. Throughout the 1980s, RENAMO combatants benefited from the continual resupply of the South African government and were free to capture food, clothing and property as part of their attacks."* (Collier and Sambanis EDS 2005:171). *"Given the poverty of life in the government forces, to which most peasants were headed anyway via conscription, life as a RENAMO soldier seemed a better option"* (Collier and Sambanis EDS 2005:171), Weinstein and Francisco conclude. The presence of such opportunity factors however does not confirm the predation hypothesis of the CH model, for opportunities were not provided by natural resource abundance but rather by external funding. Moreover, contrary to the assumptions of the CH model, rebellion was not always an individual free-choice, as RENAMO implemented a consistent pattern of forced recruitment. Also ethnic dominance did not work as the CH model predicted: although numerically dominant, the Macua-Lowme did never form *"a group-wide consciousness"* (Minter 1994:86) (probably because they had no literacy in their own language) and thus were never able to play a crucial role in national politics. Ethnicity rather interacted with regional cleavages which originated in the colonial period, when administration, social services, commerce and white settlers were concentrated in the capital city, thus determining an advantage for the Shona who inhabited the Southern region of Mozambique. Last but not least, grievances mattered in increasing civil war risk: if one looks at the heterogeneous composition of RENAMO in its initial phase, one can actually see each of the social groups included in it had reasons to grieve about FRELIMO. Minter (1994) noted individuals belonging to the social group of *"retornados"*, that is the Portuguese departing from Angola and Mozambique after the two countries gained independence, played a prominent role in sparking civil strife in those countries, as they *"had ample motives to seek to overthrow the post-colonial states or at least to punish them in revenge"* (Minter 1994:99). As far as the Mozambican citizens who gradually joined RENAMO are concerned, they shared a resentment towards FRELIMO, as their new social status was relatively worse than the one enjoyed during colonialism. In rural communities, traditional authorities and peasants initially welcomed RENAMO as they were convinced the rebels could block government interference on their way of life and prevent displacement implied by villagisation policies. In order to improve theorization on horizontal inequalities two aspects are worth noticing: RENAMO was not a culturally-formed but a socially formed group, including heterogeneous sub-groups which historical circumstances pooled together to share resentment towards FRELIMO. Further, grievances of the members of RENAMO derived from confrontation with the social status they enjoyed before FRELIMO took power. In the case of Mozambique then diachronic inequalities mattered in terms of increasing civil war risk.

Conclusions

In this paper, we have very briefly reviewed opposing views over the effects of globalization on poverty and inequality. We have then examined agreement on Africa's development crisis, withdrawing from Collier who underlines the presence of a "conflict trap" hindering the chances for African countries to benefit from globalization. But we have further suggested that African propensity to civil conflict may have different roots than the ones highlighted by Collier and Hoeffler. Let us now suppose that globalization can actually do good for African growth and development. Collier (2006) has suggested a two-folded recipe for Africa to raise itself from its current position at the bottom of mankind: on one hand, the removal of the four traps (corruption trap, natural resource trap, socially fragmented low-scrutinized societies trap and the conflict trap) and on the other, a "big push" in order for *"marginal, incremental forces [to] get overwhelmed by the locally stabilizing forces of the trap"* (Collier 2006:195). The policies that Collier suggest for the big push to be effective aim at the efficient management of natural resource

rents: they include a large revenues-large expenditures implication as well as a set of measures to address Dutch disease, such as a “*combination of 'exchange rate protection', trade liberalization and expenditures on infrastructure [assisting] the export sector*” (Collier 2006:206). If African propensity to civil war is well explained by natural resource dependence, as Collier and Hoeffler maintain, then such measures are a valid solution to break the conflict trap as well. Yet if our suggestions are right, i.e. horizontal inequalities increase civil war risk, we can doubt that diversification and trade-friendly external economic policies can be sufficient to grant Africa a future of prosperity.

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